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Abstract
Progressive capital taxation is introduced into a real-business-cycle (RBC) model with
fiscal policy. The artificial economy is calibrated to Bulgarian data for the period 1999-
2018. The quantitative role of progressive taxation on capital income is investigated for
the stabilization of cyclical fluctuations in Bulgaria. Unfortunately, the quantitative
effect of the presence of such a tax turned out to be very small, and thus not important
for either business cycle stabilization, or public finance issues.
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1 Introduction and Motivation
Taxing capital is an old and still a controversial issue among economists, and the literature
is inconclusive whether it should be taxed, and how exactly it should be taxed.1 We are not
going to take a stance whether capital income should be taxed or not; instead, we take it as
a given across the globe. What is novel in this paper is the pursuit of the question whether
taxing capital income should be done in a progressive- vs a proportional manner, especially
in a developing country context. On the one hand, it is believed that capital taxation is the
most distortionary tax, as it affects capital accumulation and investment decisions. On the
other hand, it can be argued that a cyclical capital income tax, and a progressive capital
income tax in particular, may act as a built-in stabilizer for the economy, in the same way
a progressive labor income tax could by decreasing demand during expansions, and by in-
creasing demand during downturns.2
This proposal is taken seriously, and this paper incorporates a progressive capital income
tax in an RBC model with government. We take an agnostic view and let a computational
experiment guide us, given that there is no other disciplined way to conduct a disciplined
counterfactual examination. The micro-founded model based in optimization is calibrated
for Bulgaria in the period 1999-2018, as Bulgaria makes a good example for the application
of the theory.3 The paper then proceeds to quantitatively evaluate the effect of such a pro-
gressive capital income tax as a tool for business cycle stabilization, and the implications for
public finances. This study is one of the few quantitative ones on the issue of tax reforms in
emerging Eastern European economies, which utilizes modern macroeconomic analysis, and
thus aims to bring novelty to the literature on transition economies. Unfortunately, for rea-
sonable degree of capital income tax progressivity, the quantitative effects in the calibrated
1For a survey of recent discussion, see Bastani and Wladenstrom (2020), Fehr and Kindermann (2015),
Conesa et al. (2009), and the references therein.
2For a survey of different tax reforms in Bulgaria and their effect on the business cycle, the reader is
referred to Vasilev (2017a), Vasilev (2015a,2015b), Di Nola et al (2019), as well as the references therein.
3Before the introduction of proportional income taxation of 10 percent in 2008, Bulgaria operated a
progressive income taxation regime during the period 1993-2007 with the same effective rate. In addition,
the corporate income tax rate has been reduced, in several steps, to a proportional rate of 10 percent in 2007
as well, to avoid incentives to move earnings across the income categories.
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model are miniscule. Therefore, we conclude that such a tax is neither a good instrument for
aggregate demand management over the cycle, nor is it an appropriate measure for raising
additional tax revenue.4,5
The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the model setup and derives the
decentralized competitive equilibrium system, Section 3 presents the calibration procedure,
and Section 4 documents the steady-state model solution. Sections 5 focuses on the out-of-
steady-state dynamics of model variables, and compares the simulated moments of model
variables against the empirical ones. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model Description
There is a stand-in household in the model, which experiences utility out of consumption and
leisure. The time endowment of the household can be spent working, or enjoyed as leisure.
The government sector taxes consumption and income in order to finance its expenditure.
Lastly, there is a stand-in firm, which rents labor and capital from the household to produce
the final good.
2.1 Representative Household






ln ct + γ ln(1− ht)
}
(1)
where E0 is the household’s expectations as of period 0, ct is the household’s private con-
sumption in period t, ht are the hours worked in period t, 0 < β < 1 denotes the discount
factor, 0 < γ < 1 is the relative weight attached to leisure.
The household starts with an initial quantity of physical capital k0 > 0, and chooses how
4Similar quantitative results were obtained for a proposed introduction of a progressive consumption tax
in Vasilev (2020).
5Vasilev (2016a,2017b) show that progressive income taxes, when levied on both capital and labor, produce
indeterminacy and multiplicity of equilibria in the system.
3
much to grow it. Physical capital evolves as follows:
kt+1 = it + (1− δ)kt (2)
and 0 < δ < 1 denotes the linear depreciation rate. The real interest rate is denoted by
rt, hence the before-tax capital income of the household in period t is expressed as rtkt. In
addition to capital income, the household can obtain labor income. Hours supplied to the
stand-in firm are remunerated at the hourly wage rate of wt, thus pre-tax labor income can be
expressed as wtht. Lastly, the household owns the firm in the economy and all of its profit, πt.










(1 + τ c)ct + kt+1 − (1− δ)kt = (1− τ kt )[rtkt + πt] + (1− τ l)wtht + gtt (4)
where where τ c is the tax on consumption, τ l is the proportional income tax rate on la-
bor (0 < τ c, τ l < 1), τ kt is the progressive rate applied to capital income, and g
t
t denotes
government transfers. The household takes the tax rates {τ c, τ l, τ kt }∞t=0, government spend-
ing (consumption and transfers) categories, {gct , gtt}∞t=0, profit {πt}∞t=0, prices {wt, rt}∞t=0, and
chooses {ct, ht, kt+1}∞t=0 to maximize its utility subject to the budget constraint.
The progressivity of the capital tax schedule in this paper is captured by adopting the
functional form of Guo and Lansing (1998), later also utilized in Vasilev (2016a, 2017b)
for the progressivity of the income tax schedule, as a function of capital income (expressed
relative to the steady-state capital income):






where η > 0 is the effective average capital tax rate, and 0 < φ < 1 captures the degree of
progressivity of the capital tax.
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= λt(1− τ l)wt (7)
kt+1 : λt = βEtλt+1
[
1 + [1− (1 + φ)τ kt+1]rt+1 − δ
]
(8)
TV C : lim
t→∞
βtλtkt+1 = 0 (9)
where λt denotes period-t Lagrangian multiplier. The intuition obtained from the optimal-
ity conditions above is as follows: the household balances the utility from consumption at
the margin, with the shadow price of spending, including the the consumption tax rate.
Next, when choosing labor hours, the gain from working balances with the disutility cost.
In the third equation, the household allocates physical capital over time optimally, taking
into consideration the progressivity of capital taxation. The last condition is called the
”transversality condition” (TVC): it states that the value of physical capital should be zero
at the boundary of the optimization horizon.
2.2 Firm problem
There is a stand-in firm in the economy, which produces the final output; the price is normal-
ized to unity. The production technology is Cobb-Douglas and uses both physical capital,





t − rtkt − wtht, (10)










In the model in this paper, the government is taxes income and consumption, in order to







t [rtkt + πt] (13)
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2.4 Dynamic Competitive Equilibrium (DCE)
For a given process for technology {At}∞t=0, the tax schedules {τ c, τ l, τ kt }∞t=0, and initial
capital endowment {k0}, the DCE for this economy is a list of allocations {ct, it, kt, ht}∞t=0
for the household, a pair of public consumption and transfers allocations for the government
{gct , gtt}∞t=0, and prices {wt, rt}∞t=0 such that (i) the stand-in household maximizes its expected
utility function s.t. its budget constraint; (ii) the stand-in firm maximizes its profit; (iii) the
government runs a balanced budget; (iv) all markets clear.
3 Data and Model Calibration
To study business cycle fluctuations in Bulgaria, we will focus on the period 1999-2018.
Quarterly data on output, consumption and investment was extracted from National Sta-
tistical Institute (2020) database, while the real interest rate was taken from Bulgarian
National Bank Statistical Database (2020). The calibration strategy is as follows: first, as
in Vasilev (2016), the discount factor is set to match the steady-state capital-to-output ratio
in Bulgaria, k/y = 13.964. Next, the labor share parameter, 1 − α = 0.571, is set equal
to the average value of the wage bill in aggregate output. Next, both τ l = τ k = η = 0.1,
which is the average effective tax rate on income between 1999-2007, when Bulgaria used
progressive income taxation, and equal to the proportional income tax rate introduced as of
2008. Similarly, τ c = 0.2. The degree of capital tax progressivity was set equal to φ = 0.43.6
Next, γ, is calibrated to match the steady-state hours worked, h = 1/3. This is in line with
the estimates for Bulgaria (Vasilev 2017a) as well over the period studied. Next, δ = 0.013,
was estimated as the average quarterly depreciation rate. Finally, the process followed by
the TFP process is estimated from the detrended Solow residuals. Table 1 below presents
the values of all model parameters used in the paper.
6This corresponds to the degree of progressivity of the labor income tax schedule during the period 1993-
2007 in Bulgaria. Robustness checks with different (higher and lower) values did not change the results in
any major way.
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Table 1: Model Parameters
Parameter Value Description Method
β 0.982 Discount factor Calibrated
α 0.429 Capital Share Data average
1− α 0.571 Labor Share Calibrated
γ 0.873 Relative weight attached to leisure Calibrated
δ 0.013 Depreciation rate on physical capital Data average
τ l 0.100 Average tax rate on labour income Data average
τ c 0.200 VAT/consumption tax rate Data average
η 0.100 Average tax rate on capital income Data average
φ 0.430 Degree of progressivity, capital taxation Data average
ρa 0.701 AR(1) persistence coefficient, TFP process Estimated
σa 0.044 st. error, TFP process Estimated
4 Steady-State
Once the values of model parameters were obtained, the steady-state equilibrium system
solved, the ”big ratios” can be compared to their averages in Bulgarian data. The results
are reported in Table 2 below. The model matches the major ratios in data quite well, which
is amazing for such a parsimonious model.
5 Out of steady-state model dynamics
The model does not possess an analytical solution for the general case; in order to study
the equilibrium behavior of variables outside their steady-state values, we need to solve the
model numerically. This is done by linearizing the equilibrium system around the steady-
state. Then, we investigate the behavior of major model variables to a one-time technology
shock; then, we proceed to simulate the model fully.
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Table 2: Data Averages and Long-run Solution
Variable Description Data Model
y Steady-state output N/A 1.000
c/y Consumption-to-output ratio 0.648 0.674
i/y Investment-to-output ratio 0.201 0.175
k/y Capital-to-output ratio 13.96 13.96
gc/y Government consumption-to-output ratio 0.151 0.151
wh/y Labor income-to-output ratio 0.571 0.571
rk/y Capital income-to-output ratio 0.429 0.429
h Share of time spent working 0.333 0.333
r̄ After-tax net return on capital 0.014 0.016
5.1 Impulse Response Analysis
This subsection discusses the impulse responses of model variables to a 1% shock to tech-
nology, presented in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 for the progressive- and proportional (”flat”) capital
taxation case, respectively. In both cases, output increases upon impact, as do the uses of
output - consumption, investment, and government consumption. Interestingly, the impulse
responses across the two tax regimes are almost identical;7 next, the increase in productivity
increases the after-tax return on labor and capital, so the household works and saves more.
The increase in capital and labor inputs feed back in output through the production function
and further expand output.
Over time, as capital is being accumulated, the diminishing marginal returns kick in, and
its after-tax marginal product starts to decrease; this lowers the households’ incentives to
save, and physical capital stock slowly returns to its steady-state, following a hump-shaped
dynamics. The rest of the model variables return to their old steady-states monotonically.
7We present them on separate figures for better inspection; otherwise impulse responses across the two
regimes would be on top of each other.
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Figure 1: Impulse Responses to a 1% surprise innovation in technology (progressive taxation
case)
Figure 2: Impulse Responses to a 1% surprise innovation in technology (flat capital tax case)
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5.2 Simulation and moment-matching
We will now simulate the model 10,000 times, and then detrend both the empirical and
model simulated data using the Hodrick-Prescott (1980) filter. Table 3 on the next page
summarizes the second moments of data (relative volatilities to output, and contemporane-
ous correlations with output) versus the same moments computed from the model-simulated
data at quarterly frequency. The ”Model” is the case with the progressive capital taxation
schedule, while the ”Benchmark RBC” is a setup with proportional capital income tax rate.
In addition, to minimize the sample error, the simulated moments are averaged out over
the computer-generated draws. Both models overpredict the consumption and investment
volatilies. Still, the setups are at least qualitatively consistent with the stylized fact for Bul-
garia that consumption is smoother than output, while investment is almost twice as volatile
than output. The model with progressive capital taxation produces a bit less variable con-
sumption and investment series, but the two models are almost identical to each other.
Table 3: Business Cycle Moments
Data Model Benchmark RBC
σy 0.05 0.05 0.05
σc/σy 0.55 0.83 0.82
σi/σy 1.77 2.30 2.35
σg/σy 1.21 1.00 1.00
σh/σy 0.63 0.27 0.28
σw/σy 0.83 0.87 0.86
σy/h/σy 0.86 0.87 0.86
corr(c, y) 0.85 0.90 0.90
corr(i, y) 0.61 0.83 0.83
corr(g, y) 0.31 1.00 1.00
corr(h, y) 0.49 0.58 0.59
corr(w, y) -0.01 0.96 0.96
With respect to the labor market dimension, the predicted employment variability is lower
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than the empirical one; still model wages vary as much as in data. This is yet another
confirmation that perfectly-competitive labor markets are not very good description of the
situation in Bulgaria. Next, the model over-predicts the pro-cyclicality of the major vari-
ables; This, however, is a common limitation of such RBC models: in addition, the con-
temporaneous correlation of employment with output is too low, and the setup generates
highly-procyclical wages, while in data those acyclical.
Next, we proceed to investigate the dynamic properties model variables. In particular, we
discuss the auto-(ACFs) and cross-correlation functions (CCFs) of the major model variables,
thus evaluating how the model captures the phase dynamics with output. The coefficients
of the empirical functions are presented in Table 4 below and compared to the averaged
simulated AFCs and CCFs from the model with progressive capital income taxation.
Overall, the model compares relatively well vis-a-vis data, even though the empirical ACFs
for output and investment are slightly outside the confidence band predicted by the model;
The persistence of the major labor market variables is also relatively well-captured by the
model dynamics. Next, as seen from Table 5 below, over the business cycle, in data labor
productivity leads employment. The model, however, cannot account for this fact, which is
again an artefact of the perfectly-competitive labor market assumption.
6 Conclusions
Progressive capital income taxation is introduced into an otherwise standard RBC model
with government. The artificial economy is calibrated to Bulgarian data for the period 1999-
2018. The quantitative role of progressive taxation on capital income is investigated for
the stabilization of cyclical fluctuations in Bulgaria. Unfortunately, the quantitative effect
of such a tax is found to be very small, and thus not important for either business cycle
stabilization, or public finance issues.
11
Table 4: Autocorrelations for Bulgarian data and the model economy
k
Method Statistic 0 1 2 3
Data corr(nt, nt−k) 1.000 0.484 0.009 0.352
Model corr(nt, nt−k) 1.000 0.953 0.894 0.825
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.029) (0.056) (0.081)
Data corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.810 0.663 0.479
Model corr(yt, yt−k) 1.000 0.956 0.904 0.844
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.026) (0.051) (0.074)
Data corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.702 0.449 0.277
Model corr(at, at−k) 1.000 0.955 0.901 0.838
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.027) (0.053) (0.076)
Data corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.971 0.952 0.913
Model corr(ct, ct−k) 1.000 0.958 0.908 0.852
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.026) (0.050) (0.072)
Data corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.810 0.722 0.594
Model corr(it, it−k) 1.000 0.952 0.892 0.821
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.029) (0.056) (0.081)
Data corr(wt, wt−k) 1.000 0.760 0.783 0.554
Model corr(wt, wt−k) 1.000 0.957 0.907 0.850
(s.e.) (0.000) (0.026) (0.050) (0.073)
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